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 1 
Mainstream Constructivist scholarship on norm diffusion in international 
relations (IR) is marked by considerable western-centrism.
1
 This bias is apparent in 
the overwhelming focus of Constructivist research on the promotion of what are 
conventionally understood to be ‘good’ global norms,2 by western-based actors,3 in 
non-western contexts.
4
 Norms are generally presented as travelling from a western 
core to a non-western periphery, from western norm-makers to non-western norm-
takers.
5
 It is no surprise, then, that over the years Constructivist literature has been 
criticized as suffering from a ‘liberal’ (Adamson, 2005), ‘cosmopolitan’ (Acharya, 
2004), or ‘secular’ (Kubálková, 2003) bias, which neglects non-western normative 
agency. 
Constructivism’s western-centrism tends to overlook that the international 
sphere is replete with normative contestation.
6
 The international sphere is, in fact, 
inhabited by a wide variety of non-western actors and norm entrepreneurs that are not 
solely norm-takers, but also active norm-makers, seeking to promote and 
internationalize their own beliefs, values and principles. This normative competition 
and complexity is becoming all the more apparent as world politics turns increasingly 
multipolar, as well as post-western (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Kupchan, 2013; 
Tickner and Wæver, 2009; Weber and Jentleson, 2010; Zakaria, 2011). 
The process of contestation and interaction between western and non-western 
norms
7
 and their entrepreneurs in international society needs to be understood better. 
This paper seeks to theoretically and empirically broaden Constructivist research by 
looking beyond the global diffusion of liberal and secular norms by western-based 
actors. A small number of scholars are starting to explicitly push Constructivist 
thinking along similar lines (Acharya, 2013; Adamson, 2005; Merry, 2006). We aim 
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to advance this emerging scholarly research by exploring the processes through which 
non-western actors promote norms within the structures of the ‘liberal international 
order’ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999; Ikenberry, 2009). In other words, we flip the 
coin and investigate norm diffusion from a non-western periphery to a western core, 
and by non-western norm-makers to western norm-takers. 
It is possible to think of several non-western agents and norms that interact 
with the actors and norms of the liberal order. We focus on religious-based norms 
promoted by actors anchored to an Islamic tradition in the context of global 
governance institutions such as the United Nations (UN). A focus on political Islam is 
warranted for a number of reasons. We believe that what Fiona Adamson (2005: 565) 
pointed to as the ‘relative silence’ in mainstream Constructivist research on political 
Islam still largely stands. This neglect is also particularly egregious since concerns 
about the role of Islam and Islamists of all strides have dominated international 
relations practices and debates for over a decade. 
The paper contends that non-western religious-based actors have the greatest 
opportunity to diffuse their norms, within the institutions of the liberal international 
order, when their norms become intelligible from a secular, liberal, normative 
perspective through a successful process of institutional translation. When using the 
concept of translation to explore the dynamics of norm diffusion across different 
institutional and cultural contexts – in particular between a religious-Islamic and a 
secular-liberal context – we draw from debates on the ‘post-secular’, spearheaded by 
Jürgen Habermas
8
 (2008; 2006; Habermas and Mendieta, 2010; Habermas et al., 
2010). In particular we refer to Habermas’ institutional translation proviso, which 
requires that religious idioms be translated into universally acceptable secular 
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language not at the source but when entering the formal legislative, executive and 
judicial deliberations of the state. 
We contend that much of the learning and deliberative process between 
secular and religious actors that, for Habermas, should take place in post-secular 
liberal domestic settings, does, in many respects, already occur in the global public 
sphere. We are in a post-secular world society. Thus, the Habermasian concept of 
institutional translation can be understood not solely as a normative requirement for 
religious arguments to be included in the political deliberations of secular institutions, 
but also as an analytical causal mechanism,
9
 through which norms that do not 
originate from a liberal tradition are diffused in liberal international settings and 
within secular global governance institutions.
10
  
We define institutional translation as the process of normative transmission 
between differently situated international actors, whose principles originate from 
diverse cultural and ethical backgrounds, whether these are religious, secular, 
national, ethnic or cultural.
11
 Within this process, the norms’ meaning is contested and 
negotiated and, when translation is successful, it establishes an open hermeneutic 
margin for its interpretation. This requires, to borrow the language of Michael Walzer 
(1994: x), ‘thinning’ a ‘thick’ culturally embedded particularist norm.12 A successful 
translation will converge towards a norm that transcends particularism, and hence 
enjoys legitimacy beyond the context in which it originated. The open hermeneutic 
margin of the translated norm provides it with a higher degree of vagueness and 
malleability, which facilitates agreement between promoters and receivers over the 
meaning and legitimacy of the norm, even if the parties differ over its ethical 
justification. That is, the process of translation allows for the possibility that, while a 
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norm entrepreneur uses one language and set of meanings rooted in a particular 
cultural milieu, the receiving agents, when and if they become socialised in the new 
norm, internalise it in their own semantics and knowledge structures.
13
 
We build on an emerging interest within constructivist scholarship in 
processes and mechanisms of norm ‘translation’ (Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, 2011; 
Brake and Katzenstein, 2013; Zwingel, 2012). More specifically, we seek to 
contribute to the development of what can be described as a third wave of research on 
the cross-cultural dynamics of norm diffusion. First wave scholarship generally 
portrays non-western actors as norm-takers. These are socialized and ‘converted’, 
thanks to the ‘persuasive’ power of the ‘better argument’ or the ‘better norm’, into the 
structure of meaning of the entrepreneurial, liberal, western-based norm-maker.
14
 
Second wave scholarship has been more sensitive to non-western agency and 
processes of cross-cultural normative contestation and re-interpretation. Yet, non-
westerners are still largely seen here as norm-takers ‒ albeit as active ‘mimickers’ 
(Katsumata, 2011), ‘localizers’ (Acharya, 2004), and ‘vernacularizers’ (Merry, 2006; 
Levitt and Merry, 2009) ‒ and rarely appear as norm-makers.  
By highlighting the mechanism of institutional translation we seek to open up 
the study of norm dynamics beyond centre-periphery diffusion, still present in notions 
such as vernacularization or localization for instance. Translation subsumes 
localization, but also includes de-localization, a process in which particular non-
western norms are diffused and non-western agents become norm-makers in world 
politics. Moreover, compared to unidirectional processes of persuasion, institutional 
translation opens the study of normative dynamics by considering the active role of 
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western and non-western culturally-situated agency in dialogical dynamics of norm 
contestation. 
The mechanism of institutional translation is illustrated empirically through 
two case studies on the normative activity of the Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). We concentrate on two norms that the OIC has sought to promote within the 
UN, with varying degrees of success, since the late 1990s: the dialogue of 
civilisations and the defamation of religion.  These cases are not intended to be 
exhaustive, but to shed some light on norm diffusion through processes of 
institutional translation in at least two ways. First, they exemplify the promotion, by 
non-western norm-makers, of norms that originate outside the liberal tradition. 
Second, their contrasting outcomes show the value of institutional translation in 
explaining how religious norms, and more generally non-western norms, diffuse in 
global settings. We argue that the diffusion of the dialogue of civilisations was the 
result of the successful institutional translation of the norm from its original Islamic 
formulation into a principle embraced also by non-OIC states. The non-diffusion of 
religious defamation was due in large part to the barriers faced in translating the norm 
into a more universally acceptable idiom, hence failing to garner widespread support. 
Non-western agency, religious norms, and the limits of 
Constructivist research 
Spearheaded by Constructivist scholars, the empirical and theoretical 
investigation into the causes and consequences of norm diffusion in international 
society has become a thriving research program in IR. This literature concentrates 
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mostly on certain types of norm dynamics. In particular the dynamics of liberal, 
cosmopolitan, secular norms  - whether human rights, gender rights, international law, 
good governance, and so on - that are promoted, in international and local non-
western contexts, by norm-makers largely of western origin, or closely tied to the 
structures of the western-based liberal international order.
15
 
This focus, we argue, is the outcome of an implicit western-centrism present in 
much IR theory.
16
 This bias, when it comes to Constructivist research on norm 
dynamics, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it underpins a narrow 
research agenda, which overlooks the variety of non-western norm entrepreneurs 
populating the international sphere and seeking to promote their own values. Second, 
because it appears tied largely to a view of world politics anchored to the ‘unipolar 
moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990) – indirectly playing into triumphalist ‘end of history’ 
narratives (Fukuyama, 2006) – at a time when the international is increasingly 
becoming multipolar as well as post-western (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Kupchan, 
2013; Weber and Jentleson, 2010; Zakaria, 2011). 
What is generally called the resurgence of religion and the post-secular turn in 
the social world and scholarly thinking are an underexplored resource for broadening 
research on international change and norm dynamics beyond Constructivism’s current 
western-centrism. There are, for instance, an emerging number of alternative 
conceptions on how to structure domestic and international orders drawing on 
religion: the spread of Jihadi ideology and movements (Mendelsohn, 2012); the 
diffusion of Sharia Courts in the UK (Jucan and Georgia, 2011); the turn towards 
Confucian values as an instrument of Chinese soft power (Paradise, 2009); the 
revaluation and growth in faith-based approaches to poverty reduction and 
 7 
development (Clarke, 2007); the articulation of transnational Muslim or Sikh 
identities and political projects (Shani, 2008); and the diffusion of Islamic finance 
(Lai, 2013).
17
 
Literature on religion in IR has expanded substantially over the past decade. A 
central debate here has revolved around the degree of change in international 
relations, as a practice and body of knowledge, brought about by religion’s 
resurgence. On the one hand, some argue that religion’s return has the potential to 
bring about profound international transformations, compelling scholars to abandon 
old paradigms and radically rethink the premises of IR theory, especially its positivist 
and secularist foundations (Hanson, 2006; Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003b; Hurd, 
2008; Kubálková, 2003; Philpott, 2002; Thomas, 2005; Wilson, 2012; for a critique 
see Bellin, 2008). On the other hand, some suggest instead that, while the turn to the 
sacred does present important challenges for IR, religion can nevertheless be absorbed 
into IR’s main theoretical paradigms with only minor adjustments (Nexon, 2011; 
Sandal and Fox, 2013; Sandal and James, 2010; Snyder, 2011; for a critique see 
Kubálková, 2013).  
In practice, however, the above divisions become somewhat blurry. In fact, 
there is an emerging consensus among scholars of religion in IR, that Constructivism 
provides one of the most appropriate frameworks with which to capture the 
international dynamics and impact of the sacred. For instance, leading scholars of 
religion in IR are applying Constructivist insights to understand and explain the 
powerful role that religious identities, ideas, agents, and communities play in conflict 
resolution (Sandal, 2011), or in structuring the international system (Philpott, 2001). 
In parallel, Constructivist scholars, less anchored to the above debates on religion in 
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IR, are increasingly using their theoretical frameworks to investigate the normative 
activity and agency of Islamist movements in Central Asia (Adamson, 2005), or of 
humanitarian religious-based actors around the world (Barnett and Stein, 2012; 
Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, 2011).  
While representing innovative avenues of research, much of this literature, 
however, tends to borrow and adjust Constructivist frameworks to the specificity of 
religious agents and ideational dynamics. It is less explicitly geared towards teasing 
out how social and political research, originating in scholarly debates on religion, can 
more broadly move forward Constructivist research on international norm dynamics. 
In other words, the novelty that religious resurgence processes, and post-secular 
theorizing may represent, for Constructivism is often left under-explored. We suggest 
that Habermasian post-secular thinking has the potential to empirically and 
theoretically expand Constructivist research on cross-cultural norm diffusion and 
contestation in novel and important ways. We want to be more modest here than 
proposing the abandonment of old, or the creation of novel, theoretical paradigms 
when considering the dynamics of religious norms in IR. Yet we also want to be more 
ambitious than simply absorbing religion into standard IR Constructivist theory. We 
are proposing a more explicit via media, which we believe is to the mutual benefit of 
both enterprises.  
First, the notion of a post-secular society – when transferred from the domestic 
to the global realm – broadens the Constructivist horizon towards a greater 
appreciation and consideration of ideational dynamics, which have been, thus far, 
under-researched. Namely, processes of religious-based norm diffusion, in western-
dominated liberal international contexts, by non-western norm entrepreneurs. Second, 
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the concept of institutional translation used by Habermas in his post-secular writings 
deepens our knowledge of the mechanisms through which norms are promoted, 
contested, re-interpreted, and diffused across cultural/normative milieus. Lastly, we 
believe that this type of re-engagement with Constructivism also benefits scholarship 
on religion and the post-secular more broadly. It re-energizes attempts to show why, 
without taking religious dynamics seriously, IR scholars have only a partial view of 
the international. In fact, even though – or possibly because – over the past decade 
scholarship on religion has successfully carved out a space for itself in IR, there is a 
real chance that this research program detaches itself from broader debates in the 
discipline. We offer one possible way forward to avoid this risk.  
Institutional translation: from post-secular normative 
theory to analytical causal mechanism 
In response to religion’s political revival over the past decades, Habermas has 
progressively revised his assumptions about the place of religion in the domestic 
public sphere of constitutional liberal democracies (Habermas, 2008; Habermas, 
2006; Habermas and Mendieta, 2010; Habermas et al., 2010). He has engaged in a 
self-reflective process about the ‘aggressive secularist’ (see also Connolly, 1999) 
assumptions underlying much contemporary liberal political philosophy, which tends 
to confine religion to the private sphere. Habermas has come to articulate a normative 
ideal structured around the possibility of a ‘post-secular society’, open and inclusive 
of religions in the public sphere, which facilitates engagement between religious and 
secular citizens. 
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Habermas’ post-secular proposal 
Contemporary liberal thought, Habermas argues, asks too much of religious 
citizens, who are expected to provide secular reasons for their religiously inspired 
political mobilization in order to be legitimately admitted to the public sphere. Such a 
state of affairs robs contemporary debates of those critical voices and moral intuitions 
that religions can bring to the table, while unduly excluding from political 
participation persons who may be neither willing nor able to split their moral 
convictions and vocabulary into profane and religious strands. By distributing 
‘cognitive burdens unequally between secular and religious citizens’ (Habermas, 
2006: 13), much contemporary liberal thought seems to go against liberalism’s own 
ethos of guaranteeing equal moral value to persons in pluralist societies. Habermas’ 
objective is to provide an updated liberal framework under which religious arguments 
and perspectives can reasonably re-enter the public sphere, while simultaneously 
seeking to salvage the strict impartiality of liberal state institutions and its corollary 
norms of church and state separation.  
To overcome these problems, Habermas narrows the scope of aggressive 
secularism over politics by introducing an ‘institutional translation’ proviso. The duty 
of providing secular translations to religious reasoning in liberal politics does not 
apply to all citizens, but only to state officials. State ‘neutrality’, for Habermas (2008: 
28), ‘does not preclude the permissibility of religious utterances within the political 
public sphere’. The separation of church and state, however, does demand that an 
‘institutional threshold’ be kept in place, acting as a ‘filter’, which allows into the 
formal proceedings of the state – whether legal deliberations or political decision 
making – only contributions that can be translated from religious vocabulary into a 
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generally accessible, secular, language (2008: 28; 2006: 10). Habermas’ (2006: 10) 
institutional translation proviso, hence, would allow religious citizens not ‘to split 
their identity into a public and a private part the moment they participate in public 
discourses’, giving them the chance instead to ‘express and justify their convictions in 
a religious language if they cannot find secular ‘translations’ for them’. 
For Habermas (2006: 17), ‘the contents which reason appropriates through 
translation must not be lost for faith’. Put differently, the process of institutional 
translation from religious into secular language is designed to allow the moral 
intuitions of faith to be accessible also to ‘non-believers through the universal 
language of reason’, while at the same time keeping ‘the boundaries of knowledge 
and faith firmly in place’ (Mavelli and Petito, 2012: 936). A successful translation 
then becomes a precondition for the substantive content of religious voices to be taken 
up in the agendas and negotiations within political bodies.  
For effective translations to occur, both religious and secular actors need to 
adopt a self-reflective stance that opens up space for mutual learning and cooperation. 
Religious citizens ought to recognize that, at the level of state institutions and 
practices, ‘only secular reasons count therein’ (Habermas, 2006: 10) and, hence, they 
should accept that their arguments be translated. Secular citizens must share the 
burden of translating religious into non-religious reasons. To do so, they should 
recognize that they ‘live in a post-secular society that is epistemically adjusted to the 
continued existence of religious communities’ (Habermas, 2006: 15). They ought to 
abandon both secularist readings of modernity as well as laicist understandings of 
church-state separation, which ‘confuse the neutrality of a secular state in view of 
competing religious worldviews with the purging of the political public sphere of all 
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religious contributions’ (Habermas, 2008: 28). Secular citizens should move beyond 
‘mere tolerance’ (Habermas, 2006: 15) and remain ‘agnostic’ vis-à-vis religious truth-
claims in the public sphere (Habermas, 2006: 17), in order to enter into genuine 
dialogue with religious citizens and take religious contributions in politics seriously. 
Institutional translation and norm diffusion  
We have not surveyed Habermas’ proposal in order to make a further 
intervention in the normative debates that his post-secular thinking has generated.
18
 
We instead wish to employ part of his conceptual toolbox to understand and explain 
international change. Our premise is that much of Habermas’ normative proposal, 
which he admits is explicitly directed at European laicist states and societies, is 
already an empirical reality around the world.  
Hence, we argue that processes of translation that Habermas posits ought to 
include post-secular domestic settings, are already taking place at the international 
level.  We are in a ‘post-secular world society’ (Habermas and Mendieta, 2010; see 
also Barbato and Kratochwil, 2009; Mavelli and Petito, 2012).
19
 This world society is 
structured around an increasingly pluralist global public sphere, which includes a 
wide range of religious-based actors and liberal global governance institutions. More 
specifically we contend that the two presuppositions necessary for effective 
institutional translations to occur – mutual reflectivity and desire to learn on the part 
of secular and religious actors – are generally present within the UN system, an 
institution constitutive of the ‘liberal international order’ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 
1999).  
 13 
The UN is a secular institution, but not an aggressive secularist one. It is 
secular because its goals, activities, and organizational structure are neither religious 
nor do they subscribe to any religious ethic. It is not aggressive secularist, however, 
because it’s underlying mission and norms are not anti-religious. In fact, the UN has 
generally been neutral and open towards the public participation of religious groups 
and communities in its debates and activities. Religious actors and voices have 
competed, and engaged in dialogue, with secular and secularist actors since the 
organization’s founding moments and, it appears, in ever-growing numbers from the 
1990s onwards (Haynes, 2013).  
By taking this analytical perspective we investigate processes where 
institutional translations – based on a genuine exchange between secular and religious 
perspectives – are leading to new normative frameworks in the context of the UN 
system. We move beyond understanding institutional translation as a normative 
requirement, conceptualizing it instead as a causal mechanism that helps explain how 
certain religious norms acquire greater traction, becoming institutionalized within the 
secularized milieu of global governance institutions, while others do not.
20
  
We also build upon, and seek to contribute to, an emerging interest within 
Constructivist scholarship itself in the processes and mechanisms of norm 
‘translation’ (Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, 2011; Brake and Katzenstein, 2013; 
Zwingel, 2012; Merry, 2006). Susanne Zwingel (2012: 124) argues that normative 
translations require both ‘the cultural concepts and the transmitters of these concepts 
such as language and customs’ of the norm promoter, to be converted into ‘the 
language and customs’ of the receiving agent’s ‘system of meaning to enable cross-
cultural understanding’. This is rarely a one-sided endeavour, but rather ‘complicated 
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and open-ended’ (2012: 124). ‘Translation’, Benjaminn Brake and Peter Katzenstein 
(2013: 730) similarly contend, ‘evokes the uncertainty of the outcome’, which is 
dependent very much on the interaction between different normative systems and 
their embedded agents.  
The concept of translation, hence, underscores the centrality of interaction 
between culturally situated agents, whereby ‘global norm creation and appropriation’ 
unfolds as ‘an open process of negotiation’ (Zwingel, 2012: 122). Importantly, we 
conceptualise this interaction as a dialogical, two-way process, whereby – in 
Walzerian terms – a ‘thicker’ culturally situated norm is translated into a ‘thinner’ 
norm, which both norm-maker and norm-taker can agree upon. This ‘thinning’ 
process echoes Habermas’ idea of ‘filtering’ (2006: 10; 2008: 28). Moreover, we 
argue that a norm that is successfully translated beyond the situated, thicker, 
normative context in which it originated, is characterized by an open hermeneutic 
margin for interpretation. As we shall see below, the successful thinning of a norm 
allows it also to acquire a degree of vagueness and malleability that enables an 
agreement between the norm-maker and the norm-taker over the norm’s meaning and 
legitimacy, regardless of their cultural/normative divide. 
An interest in translation can be seen as part of an emerging third wave of 
scholarship that seeks to unpack the complex dynamics of cross-cultural norm 
diffusion. First wave scholarship generally refers to ‘persuasion’ as the main 
mechanism through which norms diffuse (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2000). A norm-maker, generally western-based, persuades the 
norm-taker, generally non-western, thanks to the power of the ‘better argument’ or the 
‘better norm’, to adopt the former’s liberal normative structure. In some first wave 
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accounts of norm diffusion, this process of persuasion may also rely on the agency of 
local NGOs that have fully subscribed to liberal norms and therefore contribute to 
their diffusion in domestic politics (Risse et al., 1999). When discussion about the 
challenges of norm diffusion across cultural contexts features here, this emphasizes 
mechanisms of persuasion which very much depend on the entrepreneurial skills of 
the western norm-maker to strategically ‘frame’ or ‘graft’ norms in such a way that 
they ‘resonate’, ‘fit’, or ‘match’ with the norm-taker’s local cultural context (see for 
instance Price, 2003: 596).  
Second wave scholarship has looked more closely at the agency and cultural 
background of non-western norm-takers. This has led to the identification of 
mechanisms that, unlike persuasion or fit, capture with greater nuance processes 
whereby liberal international norms diffuse through cross-cultural reinterpretation. In 
this context, non-western agents – whether civil society actors, states, or regional 
organizations – are presented either as active ‘mimickers’ (Katsumata, 2011), or 
selective ‘localizers’ (Acharya, 2004) and ‘vernacularizers’ (Levitt and Merry, 2009; 
Merry, 2006), or impervious ‘resisters’ (Kinzelbach, 2013), of international liberal, 
cosmopolitan, secular norms.  
 Compared to first wave scholarship, which theorises mostly one-way 
processes of persuasion, and attendant practices of grafting and fitting, instead the 
mechanism of translation puts greater stress, similarly to second wave scholarship, on 
cross-cultural normative contestation. Translation highlights how norm-takers are not 
always pristinely socialized or, better, ‘converted’21 into the norm-maker’s value 
structure. Norms, as Zwingel (2012: 126) aptly puts it, are to a large extent ‘cross-
culturally negotiated […] rather than imposed’. In particular, translation captures 
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processes where the norm entrepreneur uses one language and set of meanings, rooted 
in its own particular cultural and normative milieu (pace fitting), and where the 
receiving agents, when and if they become socialized in the new norm, internalize it 
in their own language and set of meanings (pace persuasion). Translation is clearly 
anchored to a Habermasian logic of argument, yet it does not require and expect 
agents to change their identities as an outcome of deliberative processes.
22
  
Although translation shares much with dynamics identified by second wave 
scholarship – particularly with processes of localization and vernacularization – it 
captures a more general and far-reaching process. Localization and vernacularization 
still reproduce a core-periphery, global-local, norm dynamic present in much of first 
wave literature. Furthermore, these processes, especially in the case of 
vernacularization, can lead to some important aspects of the original norm being ‘lost 
in translation’.23 In successful processes of institutional translation, instead, the 
original meaning of the norm cannot be lost for the norm-maker. Furthermore, the 
notion of translation is agnostic about the direction in which norms travel. As we 
show below, it detects also processes of diffusion relating to norms that do not 
originate in the liberal western centre. Translation captures cross-cultural dynamics of 
norm diffusion between and across levels of analysis, as norms are promoted and 
travel ‘upward, downward, and sideways’ (Brake and Katzenstein, 2013: 729). This 
allows exploring non-western agents not solely as active norm-takers, but also as 
independent norm-makers, who attempt to internationalize norms beyond their 
cultural and local context.  
The case of OIC’s normative action 
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Islam and political Islam have become an important source on the basis of 
which much international political and military activity has been legitimized and 
taken place in the past decades. The OIC is one of the international multilateral actors 
that have often sought to promote norms reflecting its Islamic inspiration within the 
international sphere. Founded in 1969, the OIC gathers together 57 states and defines 
itself as ‘the collective voice of the Muslim world’. Among the OIC’s key aims, 
presented in its charter, is to ‘Protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat 
defamation of Islam and encourage dialogue among civilisations and religions’ 
(Organization of Islamic Conference, N.D.). 
We focus in particular on the OIC and its member states’ effort to promote 
dialogue of civilisations as well as religious defamation norms at the UN. As we shall 
see, the religious character of an organization and its norms do not necessarily conflict 
with the principles that regulate international society. Yet, the accommodation of a 
religion-based organization’s normative agenda within secular liberal institutions, 
such as the UN, can produce frictions and ambiguous results. We explore the OIC 
delegation’s activism at the UN because liberal global governance institutions 
epitomise the empirical and normative conditions at the international level that allow 
for processes of institutional translation between the secular and the religious to 
occur, conditions which Habermas posits are necessary for post-secular societies to 
emerge. 
 Dialogue of Civilisations  
Middle Eastern politics were deeply affected by the global changes brought 
about by the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, exhausted by a devastating war 
with Iraq (1980-1988) and by sustained economic sanctions, at a time of unrivalled 
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American power, the Iranian government increasingly adopted stances that signalled a 
growing will to normalise relations with western states. This period saw the election 
of, first, Akbar Ahmed Rafsanjani, and then Muhammad Khatami to the Iranian 
presidency. Despite being fully committed to the Islamic revolution, both presidents 
were increasingly concerned with the negative repercussions of Iran’s prolonged 
international isolation and both therefore adopted new foreign policy stances 
(Ehteshami, 2002). 
Within this context, Khatami put forward the normative proposal for a 
dialogue of civilisations at the OIC, and later through the OIC to the international 
community.24 As conceived by Khatami, and endorsed by Muslim-majority states 
during the OIC’s Eighth Islamic Summit Conference in Teheran in 1997, the dialogue 
of civilisations was intended as a global initiative seeking to promote international 
peace by establishing the conditions for respect and dialogical exchange between 
peoples and states anchored to diverse, but equally respectable, civilisations – above 
all between the world of Islam and the West. The OIC’s 1997 Summit Conference 
Final Communiqué emphasized the need to encourage ‘dialogue among civilizations’ 
and to facilitate the opening of the Islamic Ummah ‘to the rest of the world within the 
framework of dialogue among civilizations’ (Organization of Islamic Conference, 
1997).  
The announcement was not an exercise in void public rhetoric. It was, instead, 
the prelude for what became a mounting campaign to promote an international norm 
that emphasized the importance of inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue for the 
maintenance of international peace. This was an initiative that went well beyond 
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traditional diplomatic practices and views of world order (Marchetti, 2009; Petito, 
2009). 
Khatami’s, and the OIC’s, vision for inter-civilisational dialogue were rooted 
in a particular reading of Islamic tradition. The OIC’s communiqué would not fail to 
explain that ‘the need to establish understanding and interaction among various 
cultures, [is] in line with the Islamic teachings of tolerance, justice and peace’ 
(Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 1997). More specifically, the former Iranian 
President presented the dialogue of civilisation as an instance of ijtihad,
25
 whereby the 
Islamic message should be reinterpreted on the basis of its foundational principles, but 
also in light of the historical changes and contexts which Muslims experience 
(Khatami et al., 2001). This context, for Khatami, was one of shifting civilisational 
dynamics, where the ‘Islamic Ummah, once a flag-bearer of knowledge, thought and 
civilisation, has in recent centuries elapsed into weakness and backwardness’ and had 
consigned itself to a ‘painful state of passivity vis-à-vis the ostentatious dominant 
[western] civilization of the time’ (Khatami, 1997). 
The dialogue of civilisations was intended by Iran and the OIC not only as 
way of re-establishing productive relations with the international community and 
improve Islam’s image. It was also designed to improve the internal condition of 
‘Islamic civilisation’ and to put it on an equal footing with the West (Khatami, 1997). 
Through dialogue, Khatami and the member states delegations of the OIC sought to 
fight stereotypes of Islam, which clash of civilisations theories were spreading. 
‘Emphasizing the imperative of positive interaction, dialogue and understanding 
among cultures and religions’, the OIC’s Final Communiqué highlighted, was based 
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on ‘rejecting the theories of clash and conflict which breed mistrust’ (Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation, 1997). 
More importantly, though, the norm was grounded in a profound critique of 
‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 2006) narratives that dominated western discourses at the 
time. The dialogue of civilisations was understood as a process whereby different 
cultural and moral views would enjoy equal importance and influence, in contrast to 
the ‘dangerous and destructive claim’ (Khatami et al., 2001) that world history fulfils 
itself in an inevitable expansion of western liberalism. 
For Khatami (1997), western civilisation is ‘derived from the Greek city-states 
and the later Roman political system’. Muslim society, instead, has its origin in 
‘Madinat al-Nabi’ (the city of the Prophet), which represents the ideal of civilisation, 
in Islamic tradition, and marks the passage from the age of ‘jāhiliyya’ (ignorance)26 to 
the age of divine revelation. Only when Muslims are ‘secure in their true Islamic 
identity’ can they intervene, as equals, in a genuine dialogue of civilisations 
(Khatami, 1997). While acknowledging differences is important, these do not need to 
spell conflict. The Quranic verse ‘East and West belong to God’, 27 is seen by 
Khatami as supporting the notion that all civilisations share the principle of the divine 
origin of humanity, and therefore are called to cooperate with each other on an equal 
basis, rather than seeking to dominate each other (Khatami et al., 2001).
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From a localized norm, situated in an Islamic discursive framework, the 
initiative was then promoted at the UN. In 1998, Khatami and the OIC delegation to 
the UN proposed, to the General Assembly (UNGA), that 2001 be designated the 
‘United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’. At this stage, normative 
action was still fully embedded in an Islamic perspective. In a speech peppered with 
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references to ‘God’, Khatami – who would present himself ‘as a man from the East, 
the origin of the brilliant civilisations and the birthplace of divine prophets,’ – 29 put 
forward his proposal for a dialogue of civilisations by grounding it in the history of 
Islam and the Iranian revolution.
30
  
Following Khatami’s address Iranian representatives, along with a number of 
delegates of non-OIC countries
31
, began to work on a resolution to be submitted to the 
UNGA for approval. Despite its original religious foundations, the first draft did not 
include any explicit reference to Islam or to God, referring to ‘civilisations’, ‘nations’, 
‘cultural pluralism’ or ‘creative human diversity’ instead.32 The early signs of a 
process of institutional translation are manifest at this stage. From being originally 
‘thickly’ embedded in Islamic discourse, the norm of civilisational dialogue began a 
process of ‘thinning’, aiming to set it in harmony with the secularized and liberal 
language of UN resolutions. The dialogical dimension of the process was evident 
when a representative of the EU, speaking on behalf of a majority of western states, 
expressed gratitude to the drafters of the resolution for their ‘constructive approach’33 
when it came to rephrasing Iran’s original proposal in a more delocalised idiom. 
After a final re-drafting,
34
 the resolution was then submitted for discussion to 
the UNGA in November 1998.
35
  The debate that took place at the UNGA shows how 
the norm, through a process of translation from its highly contextual and particularist 
Islamic origins, successfully acquired an open hermeneutic margin that allowed it to 
be interpreted by various states on the basis of their own cultural and ethical 
perspective. Senegal’s ambassador to the UN, for example, explained his intention to 
vote for the resolution by referring to the national anti-colonial, pan-African, tradition 
initiated by its founder Leopold Sedar Senghor.
36
 The Austrian delegation to the 
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UNGA, speaking also on behalf of the European Union (EU), justified its support by 
saying that Europeans ‘know from their own historical experience that societies and 
cultures must not be seen as isolated entities, especially in an increasingly globalized 
world.’37 The Egyptian representative referred to Egypt’s historical and ‘multi-
civilisational’ tradition (including Islam).38 The diplomatic delegates of countries as 
Malaysia, India, Syria, Solomon Islands, Japan and New Zealand all brought their 
own perspectives to the forum converging on the legitimacy of the norm, but differing 
on the cultural sources of its foundation. Importantly, the UN observer for the OIC, in 
expressing its support, reiterated the importance of Islam as a foundation for 
civilisational dialogue, revealing how Muslim-majority states believed the original 
meaning of the norm had not been lost in translation.  
The resolution was approved by consensus in 1998, as UNGA resolution 
53/22, establishing 2001 as the ‘United Nations Year of Dialogue among 
Civilizations.’ The first part of 2001 saw a pattern of activities, culminating in the 
Vilnius International Conference on the Dialogue among Civilizations, which took 
place a few months before the events of September 11.  
We argue that institutional translation contributes to explain why the proposal 
by the Iranian government came to be widely accepted. The reformist leadership of 
Khatami, and attempts at a US-Iranian détente during the late 1990s, may have played 
a positive role in the norm’s success. Yet, we suggest, an explanation that relies solely 
on US-Iranian converging interests is incomplete.  
US-Iranian rapprochement – which was not only short-lived but also a highly 
complex and intermittent affair – cannot fully account for the widespread acceptance 
of the norm by the international community in 1998, and for the norm’s capacity to 
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outlive its allegedly favourable historical moment. As some suggest, the US 
government saw small value in an initiative which did little to advance its direct 
interests in the region (Tazmini, 2009: 92-97). Indeed, the US administration at the 
time was rather lukewarm towards the norm and its representative mostly sat on the 
margins during the resolution drafting process. It was European policymakers that 
mostly took the initiative to support a ‘thinned’ norm, which they recognized as valid 
from their ethical perspective.  
Second, on the occasions when the US and Iran sought to work together – for 
instance, during the “6 plus 2” UN negotiations on Afghanistan between 1999 to 2001 
– this engagement was marked more by diplomatic spats than fruitful cooperation 
(Wright, 2007). Yet, despite these unfavourable conditions, the norm promoted by 
Khatami and the OIC received a further boost by the UNGA in November 2001, when 
110 states approved, by consensus, the establishment, in a post-9/11 environment, of 
the ‘Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations’.39 The consensus around 
creating a basis for the continued practice of this norm over the years was an indicator 
that the dialogue of civilisations was not a short-lived experiment, but a practice 
rooted in a normative shift progressively internalized by the international community. 
Third, after 2001, US-Iranian relations quickly deteriorated. A growing rift 
between the two countries was marked on various occasions as the Iranian Supreme 
Guide Khamen‘ai spoiled Khatami’s attempts at détente; when George W. Bush 
designated Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’; as the Iranian nuclear crisis was reignited 
in 2002; and when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005. 
Notwithstanding the these growing tensions, and more broadly between the West and 
the Muslim world at the height of the War on Terror, multiple UN resolutions at the 
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UNGA and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) kept referring to the dialogue 
of civilisations as an authoritative normative source, even after 2001.
40
  
In 2005, civilisational dialogue norms became further institutionalized within 
global governance structures when Spain and Turkey jointly proposed the creation of 
an UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC). A High-Level Group for the Alliance was 
appointed, which included Khatami among its members, demonstrating continuity 
between the dialogue of civilisations initiative and the Alliance of Civilizations.
41
 The 
Alliance of Civilizations was acknowledged by consensus at the UNGA in 2009
42
 and 
has become a fully operational institution with an expanding record of activities.   
Overall, thanks to the full endorsement of the international community, the 
dialogue of civilisations norm has become ‘settled’ (Frost, 1996: 105-112) in the 
institutions and practices of international society. What allowed the norm to diffuse, 
and to outlive the contingent historical context in which it originated, was its ability to 
transcend its ‘thick’ particularist origins, through the process of institutional 
translation that took place between OIC and non-OIC UN delegates during the 
drafting and then approval of the UNGA resolution 53/22. This process was only 
marginally dependent on the nature of Iranian foreign relations. In fact, as we shall 
see in the next section, a norm promoted with the backing of the OIC, by countries 
with much closer ties to the US and the West than Iran, would experience a very 
different fate.  
Defamation of Religions 
When Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, was published in 1988 
Islamic leaders and heads of states of Muslim majority countries protested and 
accused the British Indian author of blasphemy. In 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
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Khomeini issued a fatwa, calling for the death of Rushdie. This was the first major 
international episode of what has become a key contemporary grievance for Islamic 
and Islamist actors. That is, the perception that Islam, as a religion, and Muslims, as a 
community, are negatively stereotyped and purposefully offended. This concern has 
increasingly emerged in the post-9/11 world, in the case of the Bush administration’s 
detention practices in the War on Terror, the Danish cartoon controversy in 
2005/2006, and the anti-Islamic film published on Youtube in 2013. 
The condemnation and criminalization of offences towards the sacred, are 
common phenomena in most religions. The Islamic tradition has its own categories 
and language. Rushdie was accused of betraying the message of Islam, and therefore 
committing the sin of ridda (apostasy), which in some interpretations of Islamic 
jurisprudence can be punished with death. (Kepel, 2002: 186-187; Rehman, 2010) 
Blasphemy, differently from apostasy, constitutes a more generic offense to the 
sacredness of Islam and its prophet Muhammad, practiced by non-Muslims (Rehman, 
2010). In line with this interpretation of Islam, several Muslim-majority countries, 
such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt, domestically enforce legislation 
against blasphemy or apostasy (Rehman and Berry, 2012; Peters and Vries, 1976; 
O'Sullivan, 2003).  
From the late 1990s, Muslim states sought to advance internationally, in 
coordination with the OIC, a normative claim to interdict the defamation of Islam, 
first, and religion, after. The defamation of Islam is understood by the OIC mostly as 
‘a claim of damage and disrepute being done to Islam.’ (Alfandari et al., 2011) By 
styling its normative activity in terms of defamation, the OIC sought to outlaw 
blasphemy globally. As part of its strategy, the OIC Permanent Observer Mission to 
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the UN would submit draft resolutions in various UN institutional contexts, hoping 
that these, over time, would become a source of international law. The endeavour 
turned out to be a failure because the norm faced significant institutional translation 
barriers. As we shall see, in fact, an explanation that does not look at the failed 
process of translation, but focuses solely on interests, would not be able to explain 
fully the observed outcome.  
The Pakistani delegation to the UN first introduced a draft resolution, on 
behalf of the OIC, on combating the ‘Defamation of Islam’, at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1999. The resolution was intended to counter ‘new 
manifestations of intolerance and misunderstanding, not to say hatred, of Islam and 
Muslims,’43 and to oppose international portrayals of Islam as a religion hostile to 
human rights. The debate that the proposal sparked in the committee was an early 
symptom of the consistent and multiple translation problems the norm would face 
over the years. 
The draft resolution prompted a tense exchange of views with ambassadors 
from the EU and other western states.
44
 They found the resolution ‘not balanced’45, 
because of its exclusive reference to Islam. Western representatives did not oppose, in 
principle, the idea of a resolution fostering religious tolerance, but proposed a set of 
amendments,
46
 which substituted ‘defamation’ for ‘stereotyping’ and abandoned any 
mention of Islam in favour of a general reference to all religions. In short, the EU 
delegation was trying to propose an institutional translation of the norm. The 
Pakistani delegation, on behalf of the OIC, nonetheless, saw eliminating any reference 
to Islam as ‘defeat[ing] the purpose of the text’ and asked Germany to withdraw the 
amendments.
47
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Consensus on the resolution was patently missing and another round of 
negotiations was necessary. Eventually, a compromise was reached and resolution 
1999/82 was adopted by consensus at the UNCHR.
48
 The new resolution now had a 
more general title, ‘Defamation of Religions’, but still singled out the case of Islam in 
the text. Western states remained deeply unsatisfied. The German delegate argued that 
no religion could be evoked as a pretext for human rights violations, and EU member 
states made clear that ‘they did not attach any legal meaning to the term ;defamation’, 
as used in the resolution.
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When Pakistan’s delegation on behalf of the OIC proposed at the UNCHR a 
highly specific norm ‘thickly’ grounded in the Islamic prohibition of blasphemy 
(Rehman and Berry, 2012: 444-449), the members of the international community 
entered into a debate over the meaning of the norm and the possibility of its 
institutional translation. The debate on resolution 1999/82 was only the beginning of a 
process of norm contestation between the OIC representatives and their critics that 
would last over a decade. From the point of view of the critics of the anti-defamation 
norm, no legitimate measure could single out Islam as a religion deserving particular 
protection, nor could a religion itself be legally protected, since only persons are 
entitled to rights (Dacey, 2012: 2-3). Moreover the OIC delegates’ proposal 
manifestly clashed with freedom of opinion and speech norms. 
These translation hurdles were never fully remedied in subsequent drafts 
proposed by the OIC representatives. From 1999 to 2005 the delegations of states 
representing the OIC promoted the same ‘Defamation of Religion’ resolution at the 
UNCHR. From 2001, however, the diplomatic officials of western states adopted a 
particular strategy. First, they requested an individually recorded vote over the 
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resolution proposed by the OIC delegates. This allowed them to show their dissent 
over the norm, although the OIC was still able to get the resolution approved by a 
majority, thanks to the support of most developing countries. Second, the 
representatives of the western coalition proposed a competing norm in the form of an 
UNGA resolution titled ‘elimination of all forms of religious intolerance’50. This 
formulation of the norm did not contain reference to a specific religion and was firmly 
rooted in the liberal principles that inform western states as well as the UN charter 
(Alfandari et al., 2011: 7).  
From 2005, in the wake of the Danish cartoon controversy, the OIC stepped 
up its campaign to sponsor religious defamation resolutions at the UNGA, similar to 
those presented at the UNCHR since 2001.
51
 Unsurprisingly, the delegations of 
western countries continued to vote against this, while, proposing their own version of 
the norm, albeit under the slightly revised form of ‘elimination of all forms of 
intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief.’ Each time the OIC 
presented a resolution criminalizing defamation of religion, western diplomats 
proposed their own.
52
 Any attempt at translation had faltered, as alternative proposals 
were put forward reflecting the particular normative background of the parties. 
From 2005 to 2010 there was a steady erosion of support for the OIC’s 
resolution at the UNGA, as a growing number of previously supportive delegations of 
developing states started to abstain or vote against. By 2010, delegations from western 
states obtained full international consensus over their formulation of the norm, but the 
OIC’s normative activity was faltering. In 2010 the OIC’s resolution passed through the 
UNGA with the lowest number of votes possible; in fact, votes in favour were fewer than the 
sum of abstentions and votes against. In 2009 and in 2010, OIC representatives from 
Syria
53
 and Tajikistan
54
 voiced their disappointment over an allegedly non-
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cooperative stance of western states on the issue. A parallel process was taking place 
at the UNHRC with the same procedures and outcomes. 
A number of high-level UN officials played a pivotal role in delegitimizing the 
OIC’s proposals in the eyes of the wider international community within the UNHRC, 
the UNGA, and other UN venues.
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 The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, and the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights were increasingly called upon to address the 
issue of defamation of religions (Alfandari et al., 2011: 21-26; Kayaoglu, 2012b: 14-
19; Langer, 2010). Despite a series of disagreements (Rehman and Berry, 2012: 440-
441) – reflecting the contested nature of the norm itself – their work contributed to 
build an influential body of opinion on defamation that argued against the need for 
new legal standards. UN officials mostly called on OIC states to replace the focus on 
‘defamation’ with the legal concept of combating ‘incitement to national, racial or 
religious hatred’ grounded in international law.  
With dwindling international support, in 2011 the member states delegations 
of the OIC decided to drop their campaign, fearing a negative vote both at the UNGA 
and the UNHRC. Instead, resolutions 16/18 and 66/167 were adopted by consensus, 
respectively at the UNHRC and the UNGA, under the title ‘combating intolerance, 
negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to 
violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief.’ These resolutions 
were mostly receptive of the requests of western states in previous years, avoided the 
term defamation, and sanctioned a shift from protecting Islam from criticism, to 
protecting individuals from discrimination or violence based on religion (Evans, 
2011). No calls were made for legal restrictions on expression, but rather, there were 
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proposals in favour of positive measures to address intolerance and violence based on 
religion. 
Despite reaching an agreement on paper, the OIC has largely seen this as a 
defeat. That’s because its defamation norm was ‘lost in translation’. Leaders from 
OIC countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly declared their 
unchanged commitment to continuing promoting the norm internationally 
(Goodenough, 2011). Since 2011, the OIC has pursued several initiatives on 
defamation within its membership and outside the purview of the UN (Rehman and 
Berry, 2012: 450-453). 
Overall, through most of the period of normative contestation, western leaders 
did have recognizable incentives to endorse the OIC’s proposal on defamation. Much 
of the debate on the anti-defamation norm proposed by the OIC took place at a time 
when the War on Terror was at its height. The images of the Guantanamo Detention 
Centre, the torture cases of Abu Ghraib, and the Danish cartoon controversy, 
embarrassed many western political actors and created the perception of an alleged 
‘war against Islam’. Indeed, western leaders would repeatedly emphasise their 
distance from incidents perceived as attacks on Muslims and their dignity.
56
  
Given these circumstances, it remains to be explained why the US and 
European delegations at the UN did not support the OIC’s proposal. This is especially 
so since, unlike the dialogue of civilisations, the defamation norm was sponsored 
through the OIC, at the UN, by states with close strategic ties to western countries, 
such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In response to the OIC’s normative activity and 
concerns, western countries were available to consider a global norm promoting 
religious tolerance, and did propose one. In spite of what were historically ideal 
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conditions for an anti-defamation norm to become fully institutionalized, this did not 
occur. Critics – western diplomats and UN high-level officials – did not question the 
legitimacy of Muslim concerns. They found fault with the specificity of the OIC’s 
normative proposal, and its lack of an open hermeneutic margin, which could ensure 
that the norm would be seen as legitimate from different ethical perspectives. The 
diffusion of the defamation norm faced barriers in translation, rather than 
fundamentally conflicting interests. 
Conclusion  
This article has drawn on the insights of Habermasian post-secular theory, in 
order to move IR Constructivist research on norm dynamics beyond its current 
western-centric focus. We have sought to broaden this research agenda, by 
investigating the dynamics of religious-based norms, promoted by non-western norm-
makers, within the institutional structures of the international liberal order. To this 
end, we have conceptualized institutional translation as a key mechanism that 
contributes to explain the success or failure of contentious cross-cultural processes of 
norm diffusion. 
We have defined institutional translation as a process whereby normative 
claims, situated in a ‘thick’ particular value system, are rephrased through a dialogical 
process into a ‘thinner’, more general, and universal idiom within an institutional 
context. When institutional translation is successful, the process establishes an open 
hermeneutic margin, which allows the norm to be interpreted and acknowledged as 
legitimate from multiple ethical perspectives. We understand translation as different 
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from, but also complementary to, previous research on mechanisms of norm diffusion. 
Early, first wave literature, unpacks the ‘persuasive’ power of liberal, western norm-
makers in converting norm-takers into the former’s value system. Second wave 
literature critiques accounts of persuasion by highlighting instead the creative agency 
of culturally situated non-western, norm-takers in processes of normative 
‘adaptation’, ‘localization’ and ‘vernacularization’.  
Compared to persuasion, institutional translation emphasizes how normative 
consensus can be reached without actors needing to change their identities as an 
outcome of norm diffusion. Differently from second wave literature, institutional 
translation is agnostic about the direction in which norms travel, and sees non-western 
agents also as active global norm-makers and not only as local norm-takers. Overall, 
the concept of institutional translation helps to explain when and how norms that 
originate outside of the liberal tradition diffuse internationally, hence shedding light 
on important normative dynamics that remain largely under-investigated.  
To make the case for less western-centric research on norm dynamics and the 
explanatory value of institutional translation, this study analysed the contrasting cases 
of diffusion of two Islamic-based norms promoted globally by the OIC: the dialogue 
of civilizations and the defamation of religions. We traced how, in the case of the 
dialogue of civilization, the claims in support of the norm from Iran’s government and 
the OIC’s observer mission to the UN went through a successful process of 
institutional translation, allowing the norm to become diffused and institutionalized in 
the UN system. This occurred because a ‘thinning’ of the norm was possible, without 
loosing its original meaning for OIC states’ representatives, while also allowing non-
OIC states’ delegations to recognize the norm’s legitimacy from their own distinct 
 33 
cultural perspectives. This was not an instance of persuasion, since no 
socialization/conversion to Islam was required by non-Muslim states, nor was it 
necessary for the UNGA to endorse Islamic principles.  
We show how Khatami and the OIC proposed the dialogue of civilization in a 
historical period marked by an opening of Iran towards the West. However, we also 
show that the fate of the dialogue initiative was only marginally dependent on this 
context. In fact, an Iran-West rapprochement was far from an obvious reality at the 
beginning of the normative process, and became impossible after 2001, when the 
dialogue of civilisations norm became ever more embedded within the structures of 
the UN system. We find, then, that institutional translation provides a more 
comprehensive explanatory account than one that takes into consideration solely 
contingent political calculations. 
The second example presented a case of non-diffusion due to a failed process 
of institutional translation. Multiple dialogical attempts between the OIC and Western 
states and UN officials took place for over a decade (1999-2011) in an effort to 
translate the Islamic prohibition against defamation, based on notions of blasphemy 
and apostasy. Yet, the parties were unable to reach a common agreement on the 
legitimacy of the norm from both Islamic and secular, liberal, perspectives. The 
obstacle in establishing an open hermeneutic margin, we argued, was a crucial factor 
that hindered the OIC’s ability to diffuse the norm against defamation globally.  
In fact, this occurred despite a favourable historical and political context, 
where western representatives did have multiple incentives to work with the OIC to 
pass a similar norm. First, western leaders were well aware that they needed to avoid, 
in the context of the War on Terror, the perception that they were engaged in a war 
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against Islam. Second, western delegations did, in fact, consider and then would 
promote resolutions aimed at fostering religious tolerance. Third, compared to the 
dialogue of civilization, which was largely promoted by Iran and the OIC under 
Khatami’s leadership, norms against defamation were advanced through the OIC by 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, countries with closer ties to the West than Iran. The non-
diffusion of this norm was not an epiphenomenon incidental to broader political 
dynamics but is more comprehensively explained as the result of a failed translation.  
We acknowledge that, on the basis of only two examples, it is difficult to 
make generalisations. Yet, we hope that we have begun to show how attention to 
processes of institutional translation has the potential to capture dynamics of norms 
contestation and diffusion across diverse culturally situated normative actors, until 
now generally overlooked. The hope is to foster a research agenda more sensitive 
towards understanding and explaining the emerging patterns of international change 
of an increasingly culturally diverse multipolar world society. 
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